# Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill 2023

techUK response to the House of Commons Public Bill Committee's call for evidence on the IP(A) Bill

March 2024

## About techUK

techUK is a membership organisation launched in 2013 to champion the technology sector and prepare and empower the UK for what comes next, delivering a better future for people, society, the economy and the planet.

It is the UK's leading technology membership organisation, with more than 1,000 members spread across the UK. We are a network that enables our members to learn from each other and grow in a way which contributes to the country both socially and economically.

By working collaboratively with government and others, we provide expert guidance and insight for our members and stakeholders about how to prepare for the future, anticipate change and realise the positive potential of technology in a fast-moving world.

## Introduction

The Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) 2016 sets out statutory powers used by designated public authorities, including law enforcement agencies and the UK intelligence community, to lawfully obtain, retain, and examine communications data and to give notices regarding capabilities.

The IPA 2016 emerged from a patchwork of earlier legislation, incorporating elements from acts like the Telecommunications Act 1984 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. This is crucial to consider as the landscape of technology and communication has drastically changed in the interim. The notice powers which are a key element of the Bill were originally intended for a vastly different technological era, and how they and proposals in the Bill apply to modern technology products and services raises myriad questions. Therefore, it is vital to evaluate the proposed Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill not only as a discreet set of amendments to the 2016 Act, but also within the context of how the modified regime would work as a whole and alongside the very complex regulatory framework that now governs digital markets. This holistic view will inform a comprehensive understanding of the likely ramifications of the Bill.

The IPA 2016 was adopted after a lengthy period of debate about how to safeguard national security while also respecting individuals' fundamental rights and embedding principles including transparency and judicial authorisation. The end result was a regime that allowed authorised agencies to seek lawful access to data and to issue notices to telecommunications operators where necessary and proportionate. IPA also contains world-leading safeguards which made it worthy of emulation overseas. The IP(A) Bill proposes to amend the IPA 2016.

The government has stated that the changes set out in the IP(A) Bill are only technical and seek to maintain existing capabilities for designated agencies. techUK and our members support the legitimate aims of enabling investigatory powers that are necessary and proportionate to keep citizens safe.

However, techUK members reject the UK Home Office's stance that these changes are only minor and technical. The proposed reforms raise a number of concerns. They would affect user privacy by hindering technological advancements aimed at improving consumer privacy, integrity and security. Moreover, insufficient consideration has been given to the rapidly evolving regulatory landscape and how, in combination with the secret nature of notices, these changes are also problematic due to their potential to exacerbate and/or create conflicts of laws, without clear mitigation plans. If emulated

by other nations, these changes could negatively impact UK businesses investing overseas and the provision of global services in the UK.

Achieving a balanced and proportionate approach to reform will be vital to ensuring that the operation of the legal framework governing a modified IPA regime safeguards the legitimate aims of national security and public safety without compromising the privacy, security, or safety of consumers. Indeed, this was stressed by the majority of the speakers during the Bill's second reading at the House of Commons.

Additionally, taking a balanced and forward-looking approach will be vital to maintaining the UK's international reputation as a jurisdiction that takes a balanced and proportionate approach to regulation that is supported by strong accountability mechanisms.

In this submission, techUK outlines our members' concerns around the proposed changes to definition of a telecommunications operator and the notices regime, detailed in Part 4 of this Bill. We also set out proposed amendments to the Bill and the relevant regulations and codes of practice, that would address these concerns by introducing targeted safeguards:

1. Removal of the Secretary of State's power to unilaterally extend the Notice Review Period, or include clear examples, on the face of the Bill, of what could be considered to be in scope;

2. Introduction of time and geographical limits on the review of notices provisions;

3. Introduction of double lock approval for Notifications Notices, to align with existing notices;

4. Mitigations to address conflicts of law;

5. Publication of the relevant regulations and codes of practice relating to the practical operation of a modified notices regime alongside existing regulation before the Bill is adopted so they can be scrutinised by Parliament alongside the Bill;

6. Confirmation from the government that it will allow ample time for stakeholders to respond to any public consultations on secondary legislation relating to the operation of a modified notices regime as a whole.

Please contact Audre Verseckaite at audre.verseckaite@techuk.org with any additional questions.

## Exacerbation of conflicts of law

Clause 19 of the IP(A) Bill proposes to expand the scope of the legislation by widening the definition of telecommunications operator to encompass additional persons/companies involved in the provision of telecommunications services into the UK – including when they control or provide a telecommunication system located outside the UK.

This proposed change is significant. It asserts UK jurisdiction over a greater number of entities established overseas and allows for one entity to be held liable for the actions of another. It extends UK investigatory powers to overseas companies and their global as well as UK operations, and thus weakens any nexus for UK jurisdiction.

More significantly, this will exacerbate existing conflicts of law and inevitably create new ones. Given the complex patchwork of digital laws and regulation which have emerged since 2016, a power to require foreign companies to take actions that might conflict with their applicable laws in the UK or elsewhere, or put a company in conflict with its regulatory obligations. These conflicts would be irreconcilable by companies without mitigations in the Bill.

The strict existing secrecy requirements of a notice prohibit operators from disclosing the very existence of such notice. This would prevent an operator from using a notice as a defence for a breach of a regulation or law in any jurisdiction. A non-UK firm would not even be able to disclose a notice to a court or regulatory authority in its home jurisdiction. This is significant where breaches of regulations carry heavy turnover fines or, in some cases (as with the UK's Online Safety Act), the possibility of criminal prosecution of company directors.

Given the fast-moving nature of digital regulation internationally, it is also possible that a conflict of law arises at some point during the 2-year lifespan of a notice, but the Bill does not contemplate the needs for a review within 2 years to consider the impacts of any new conflicts of law.

The broader definition of telecommunications operator in combination with an amended notice regime and today's regulation of digital markets and services, this represents a significant increase in the potential for collateral impacts which are neither recognised nor mitigated in the Bill. While the Government recognised the extraterritorial reach and conflicts of laws created by the data acquisition powers in the 2016 Act, it also identified a partial solutions. For example, to address potential conflicts of law with the US, the UK-US Agreement was implemented. However,

currently the government has not set out any plans to work towards equivalent solutions.

Within this context, it is also worth noting the potential severe impacts of this Bill on the UK-US Data Access Agreement. This was a flagship proposal alongside the 2016 Act. The agreement allows data sharing between the two countries for the purposes of preventing crime but only exists because the UK is approved as nation worthy of such an agreement. The UK's status is scheduled for review this year. Similar issues might arise in relation to other international agreements, including those with the EU.

Therefore, to ensure that the updated regime can function both legally and operationally for global businesses, it is paramount that the government provides further clarity on how the proposed notice regime will operate in practice alongside potential conflicts arising from extraterritorial reach and enforcement. This must urgently be accompanied by clear mitigations for operators to preserve their freedom to operate in the UK and internationally. We set out changes that would address these concerns below.

***Areas for improvement – addressing conflicts of law***

- **Clearer definition of "telecommunications operator"**: Ensure a nexus for UK jurisdiction by confirming that overseas firms could not be in scope for services they do not offer to UK consumers.

- **Mechanism to address conflicts of law**: Notifications notices and other notices could only be served on operators who have control over services provided in the UK (whether provided by them or another party). Please see our proposed amendments addressing this point in Annexe A.

- **Mechanism for reviewing the notice:** In recognition that new regulation in the UK and other jurisdictions could be introduced during the 2-year lifespan of a notice, introduce a mechanism for companies to request a review of a notice in cases where new conflicts of law arise during the existence of a notice.

- **Amendments to relevant regulations and codes of practice:** Secondary legislation sets out the processes and safeguards governing the use of notices and other powers. We are of the view that all relevant secondary legislation – including new regulations needed to fill gaps - should be published before the Bill is adopted, to ensure that the legislation is scrutinised holistically. Secondary legislation must:

- Clarify that proportionality tests before any notice can be given will include an assessment of the collateral impacts on an operator including foreseeable conflicts of law, their ability to comply with relevant laws and their freedom to conduct business.

- Clarify the circumstances under which an operator could disclose the existence of a notice to include relevant oversight bodies, regulators and courts where information relating to a notice may be relevant to the operator's ability to comply or to defend its conduct in an investigation. This must extend to regulatory authorities and courts both in the UK and abroad, in the circumstances where conflicts of law arise, or the operator is subject to regulatory action.

## Notification Notices in operation with the existing notice regime

Currently, to issue a notice under the IPA 2016, the Home Office is obligated to consult with the operator. The consultation typically involves discussions with the company during the drafting of the notice. If at the end of the consultation the Secretary of State takes the decision to proceed with issuing the notice, the notice goes through a double lock process, requiring approval by the Secretary of State and a Judicial Commissioner before it can be issued to the operator in question. Once the notice is issued, the operator has a 28-day window within which to request a review by the Secretary of State.

Under the IPA 2016, during the notice review period, the operator is not required to comply with the notice; and the operator may make representations both to the Judicial Commissioner and Technical Advisory Board with whom the Secretary of State must consult before taking a decision to issue, revoke or amend the notice. The notice review period itself is currently not set to any fixed timetable.

Against this backdrop, the IP(A) Bill introduces the following amendments to IPA 2016:

- **Clause 18 (*Review of notices by the Secretary of State etc*)** sets out that during the notice review period, operators are prohibited from making changes to their systems and products if they negatively impact Home Office's existing capability. This extends to operator's global products. In order to address concerns raised by industry as to the length of time the notice review period may last, the latest draft of the Bill introduces a requirement for the Secretary of State to set out and comply with a time limit for reviewing the notice. The Home Office has also committed to full public consultation on the secondary regulations governing

how the notice review period timetable will operate. This is welcome. However, we remain concerned, particularly because the Secretary of State will be granted a power to, in some circumstances, unilaterally extend the Notice Review Period.

- **Clause 21 (*Notification of proposed changes to telecommunications services etc*)** will introduce a new type of notice – the Notification Notice which, upon issuance, would require the specified operators to notify the Home Office of plans to make product or system changes to a yet-to-be-defined list of services that will be private and unique to each company. The Home Office has also committed to full public consultation on the secondary regulations detailing what is a "relevant change" for the purposes of a Notification Notice. We maintain significant concerns about this provision and believe that stronger accountability mechanisms are needed.

- As noted by the Home Office, this type of notice itself cannot block the product or system change. However, after a company that is under the Notifications Notice has notified the Secretary of State about the planned changes, the Secretary of State has an option to then initiate the process of issuing a Technical Capability Notice (TCN), which, if approved, enables the government to order a company to stop a product change.

techUK members are concerned that, when used in combination, these two powers would grant the UK government a de facto power to veto or indefinitely delay companies from making changes to their global products and services offered in the UK and internationally.

This could impede the ability of techUK members to modify products and services over time to protect users from active security threats, to innovate, and enhance their services for their users. This may result in unaddressed vulnerabilities in data security protections for consumers. Instead of focusing on improving user privacy and security, firms' attention would have to be diverted towards fulfilling the surveillance needs of the UK government.

Additionally, it is likely to have an impact on companies' data minimisation efforts expected by users, governments and regulators globally.

In turn, this could differentiate the UK from other nations negatively, as a country that is not supportive of innovation, creating a disincentive for companies to provide their services in the UK, potentially restricting what features are made available in the future.

For example, certain providers may opt to stop the collection of data on a service, or discontinue offering their services into the UK, while others may provide only limited offerings, or less secure services. This scenario could result in UK consumers losing access to many of the world's most secure products and services. This is of particular concern in the world where threats to users' data security continue to grow.

***Areas for improvement – ensuring stronger accountability measures within the updated notices regime***

It is encouraging to see the UK government commit to full public consultation on the secondary regulations implementing Clauses 18 and 21. However, given the scale of the changes being proposed, more needs to be done to ensure the updated regime is transparent, proportionate, and contains a robust accountability mechanism. As stressed by most of the speakers during the Bill's second reading in the House of Commons, increased Home Office's powers should be accompanied with stronger safeguards. We propose:

**Clause 18 (*Review of notices by the Secretary of State)***

- **Removal of the Secretary of State's power to unilaterally extend the Notice Review Period, or include clear examples, on the face of the Bill, of what could be considered to be in scope:** as set out in sections (2)(g) and (5)(g) of Clause 18, the secondary regulations may include a power for the Secretary of State to extend the notice review period where they consider *"that there are exceptional circumstances that justify the extension"*; or *"in any other circumstances specified in the secondary regulations"*. tech UK is of the view that this unilateral power on the part of the Secretary of State to extend the Notice Review Period means that there continues to be potential for the Review Period to be extended indefinitely, and therefore should be removed - or the power for extension of the Review Period should sit with the Judicial Commissioner.

- **Time and geographical limits on the review of notices provisions:** due to the company being prohibited from making any changes to its systems and products whilst the review process is ongoing, in a worst case scenario, this could result in companies being unable to make improvements and other business-critical changes to their services for considerable periods of time or choosing to withdraw their services from the UK to pre-empt being in scope of this legislation.

- Given such significant restrictions, limiting the applicability of the technical capability notice (TCN) during the notice review period only to the UK would ensure that companies are able to continue making changes to their global products whilst the notice is being reviewed in the UK, and would provide companies with much-needed certainty.

- Additionally, we are of the view that the time limit for the notices review period should be set out on the face of the Bill, and not in secondary legislation as currently intended, to provide more clarity and certainty for businesses. This is not new, and many British laws include specifying time periods for similar actions undertaken by the government or regulators, including the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill, the Communications Act 2003 and the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (please see Annexe B for more information). We suggest a 180-day limit for notices review, as originally proposed by Lord Fox during the Bill's Lords stages.

**Clause 21** ***(Notification of proposed changes to telecommunications services etc)***

- **Issuance of the new Notification Notice should be made subject to 'double lock':** Concerningly, and unlike the existing three types of notices, a notifications notice would be approved by the Home Secretary alone and not a 'double lock' process, which requires the approval by the Home Secretary and a Judicial Commissioner before it can be given to the operator in question.

- techUK members reject the Home Office's reasoning that, with respect to a Notification Notice *"the burden on the company in comparison is likely to be small, and there is no additional intrusion relating to privacy"*. This power sets a significant international precedent for prior disclosure of business plans to a government which represents a constraint on freedom to conduct business.

- Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that the same double lock authorisation is applied to the Notification Notices as for existing notices. This is a minor change, but it would bring Notifications Notices in line with the existing statutory practices for the rest of the notices regime, whilst also reassuring the industry that there are robust safeguards in place.

- **Further safeguards:** we ask that there is clarity on the face of the Bill which establishes high thresholds before a Notification Notice could be given.

## Parliamentary transparency and accountability

Despite the widespread concerns raised by techUK members, and many other stakeholders, the Bill has seen a speedy passage through the Parliament. We would point out that the proposed changes to the notice regime were not among Lord Anderson's recommendations to Government as a result of his review of the IPA earlier this year. The substantial concerns raised by our members were not debated in depth during the House of Lords stages nor have they been addressed in a meaningful way in dialogue with the Home Office. It is vitally important therefore that the Committee gives them serious attention now.

Our overarching concern remains that the significance of the proposed changes is being downplayed and we ask that the Committee focus on the impact of a combination of four things – the new notice regime, the expanded definition of telecommunications operator, today's extensive patchwork of digital regulation in the UK an overseas and the intended operation of the existing notice regime in this context.

We continue to stress the critical need for adequate time to thoroughly discuss these changes, highlighting that rigorous scrutiny is essential given the international precedent they will set and their very significant impacts. This will ensure that the updated regime is transparent, proportionate, and contains a robust accountability mechanism that is appropriate for a Bill with such significant impacts, and that the right balance on investigatory powers is maintained.

**Annexe A – proposed amendments**

**18 Review of notices by the Secretary of State**

(1) The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 90 (retention notices: review by the Secretary of State)—

(a)for subsection (4) substitute—

"(4) Where a telecommunications operator refers a retention notice under subsection (1)—

(a) there is no requirement for the operator to comply with the notice, so far as referred, and

(b) subsection (4A) applies to the operator, until the Secretary of State has reviewed the notice in accordance with subsection (5).

(4A) Where this subsection applies to a telecommunications operator, the operator must not make any relevant changes to telecommunications services or telecommunication systems to which obligations imposed by the retention notice relate.

(4B) In subsection (4A) "relevant change" means a change that, if implemented, would have a negative effect on the capability of the operator to provide any assistance which the operator may be required to provide in relation to any warrant, authorisation or notice issued or given under this Act."

(b) in subsection (5)—

(i) after "must" insert ", before the end of the review period,";

(ii) after "(1)" insert "(and accordingly decide what action to take under subsection (10))";

(c) after subsection (5) insert—

"(5A) In subsection (5) "the review period" means—

(a) such period as may be provided for by regulations made by the Secretary of State, or

(b) if that period is extended by the Secretary of State in 5 accordance with the regulations (see subsection (14)), such extended period.";

(d) after subsection (9) insert—

"(9A) The Commissioner may give a direction to the operator concerned or the Secretary of State specifying the period within which the operator or the Secretary of State (as the case may be) may provide evidence, or make representations, in accordance with subsection (9)(a).

(9B) If the Commissioner gives such a direction to the operator or the Secretary of State, the Board and the Commissioner are not required to take into account any evidence provided, or representations made, by the operator or the Secretary of State (as the case may be) after the end of that period.";

(e) in subsection (10)—

(i) for "may" substitute "must";

(ii) after "Commissioner" insert "but before the end of the relevant period, decide whether to";

(f) after subsection (11) insert—

"(11A) In subsection (10) "the relevant period" means—

(a) such period as may be provided for by regulations made 25 by the Secretary of State, or

(b) if that period is extended by the Secretary of State in accordance with the regulations (see subsection (15)), such extended period.";

(g) after subsection (13) insert—

"(14) Regulations under subsection (5A)(a) may include provision enabling any period provided for by the regulations to be extended by the Secretary of State where the extension is agreed 35 by the Secretary of State, the telecommunications operator concerned and a Judicial Commissioner.

(15) Regulations under subsection (11A)(a) may include provision enabling any period provided for by the regulations to be extended by the Secretary of State—

(a) where the Secretary of State considers that there are exceptional circumstances that justify the extension, or

(b) in any other circumstances specified in the regulations.

(16) Where regulations under subsection (11A)(a) include provision mentioned in subsection (15), the regulations must also include provision

requiring the Secretary of State to notify a Judicial Commissioner and the telecommunications operator concerned of the duration of any extended period."

(3) In section 95(5) (enforcement of retention notices etc), after "or (2)" insert ", or under section 90(4A),".

(4) In section 255(10) (enforcement of national security notices and technical capability notices), in the opening words, for "subsection (9)" substitute "subsection (8) or (9), or by section 257(3A),".

(5) In section 257 (national security notices and technical capability notices: review by the Secretary of State)—

(a) for subsection (3) substitute—

"(3) Where a person who is given a notice under section 252 or 253 refers the notice under subsection (1)—

(a) there is no requirement for the person to comply with the notice, so far as referred, and

(b) subsection (3A) applies to the person,until the Secretary of State has reviewed the notice in accordance with subsection (4).

(3A) Where this subsection applies to a person, for a period of 180 days or until the review process is completed (whichever is the shorter) the person must not make any relevant changes to telecommunications or postal services, or telecommunication systems, to which obligations imposed by the notice given under section 252 or 253 relate.

(3B) In subsection (3A) "relevant change" means–
a change that, if implemented, would have a negative effect on the capability of the person to provide any assistance which the person may be required to provide in relation to any warrant, authorisation or notice issued or given under this Act.

(a) changes that have not yet been implemented, in whole or in part, and that, if implemented, would have a serious adverse effect on the capability of the person to provide any assistance which the person may be required to provide in relation to any warrant, authorisation or notice issued or given under this Act; but

(b) do not include any changes which it would not be reasonably practicable for a telecommunications operator located outside the United Kingdom to refrain from implementing in relation to a telecommunication system in or telecommunications services

offered to the United Kingdom whilst implementing a change to any system operating or services offered outside the United Kingdom.

**19 Meaning of "telecommunications operator" etc**

(1) The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 261(10) (meaning of "telecommunications operator")—

(a) omit the "or" after paragraph (a);

(b) after paragraph (b) insert ", or

(c) controls or provides a telecommunication system which—

(i) is not (wholly or partly) in, or controlled from, the United Kingdom, and

(ii) is used by another person to offer or provide a telecommunications service to persons in the United Kingdom."

(iii) but only in so far as it is reasonably practicable for the person described in subsection (c)(i) to control the provision of that service in the United Kingdom by the other telecommunications operator and excluding the provision of any service by the person described in subsection (c)(i) outside the United Kingdom.

(3) In section 253 (technical capability notices)—

(a) in subsection (1)(a)—

(i) after "the operator", in the first place it occurs, insert "or another relevant operator"; "to whom the notice is to be given ("O") or another relevant operator ("O1")

(ii) for "the operator", in the second place it occurs, substitute "such operator"; "o"

(iii) after "authorisation" insert "but in respect of the capability of O1 only in so far as it is reasonably practicable for that capability to be secured by O"

(b) in subsection (2)(a), after "operator" insert "(to whom the notice is given)".

**21 Notification of proposed changes to telecommunications services etc**

Clause 21, page 44, line 12, at end insert ", subject to the condition in subsection (1A).

(1A) The condition in this subsection is that the decision to give the notice has been approved by a Judicial Commissioner.

(1B) A notice under subsection (1) expires at the end of the period of 14 days from the day on which the notice was first given in writing to the relevant operator.

(1C) The Secretary of State may renew a notice by virtue of subsections (1) and (1A) if the Secretary of State considers that the provisions of subsection (5) continue to apply."

Clause 21, page 44, line 36, at end insert—

(c) the decision to give the notice has been approved by a Judicial Commissioner."

Clause 21, page 45, line 26, at end insert—

"258AA Approval of notices following notification of proposed changes to telecommunications services by Judicial Commissioners

(1) In deciding whether to approve a decision to give a notice under section 258A, Judicial Commissioner must review the Secretary of State's conclusions as to whether the requirement to be imposed by the notice is necessary and proportionate for one or more of the purposes falling within paragraphs (a) to (c) of section 61(7).

(2) In doing so, the Judicial Commissioner must—

(a) apply the same principles as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review, and

(b) consider the matters referred to in subsection (1) with a sufficient degree of care as to ensure that the Judicial Commissioner complies with the duties imposed by section 2 (general duties in relation to privacy).

(3) Where a Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve a decision to give a relevant notice, the Judicial Commissioner must give the Secretary of State written reasons for the refusal.

Where a Judicial Commissioner, other than the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, refuses to approve a decision to give a relevant notice, the Secretary of State may ask the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to decide whether to approve the decision to give the notice."

## Annexe B – time limits for notices

We welcomed parliamentary efforts to introduce a limit of 180 days on the length of time for the Secretary of State to review notices, including technical capability notices. We also welcome the Government's commitment to introduce a time limit, and **would urge the Government to mirror the 180-day limit put forward by parliamentarians on the face of the bill.** While this is still a considerable period of time to withhold improvements and other business-critical changes to a service, **it would nevertheless provide industry with much needed certainty** and support business' operational planning.

Placing **time limits on the face of bills is not new**; many British laws include specifying time periods for similar actions undertaken by the government or regulators, as demonstrated by the examples below.

Where timeframes for reviewing appeals are not set out in legislation, this is primarily because providers are not required to comply while an appeal is ongoing. This is the case, for example, in the Online Safety Act where providers are appealing Ofcom's decisions relating to register of services (section 167) and in the Communications Act, when appealing an assessment notice (section 1050). However, the Investigatory P(A) Bill is expressly inserting a requirement to comply, which necessitates a time limit for reviews.

**Legislative examples**

The following legislative precedents place an onus on Government/regulators and other public bodies to do something in a given timeframe, or set other timeframes for the duration of powers or enforcement action.

- **Investigatory Powers Act 2016**:
    - Section 32 of the original legislation sets a duration for warrants, stipulating that non-urgent warrants cease to have effect after **6 months**, and urgent warrants after 5 days, unless they are extended or renewed. Any extension or renewal (as outlined in Section 33) required to be necessary, proportionate and subject to the approval of a Judicial Commissioner.
- **The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008**:
    - Stipulates a **42-day deadline** for the relevant Minister to provide a response and provide a copy of the certificate to the Upper Tribunal, for appeals related to national security certificates.

- **Civil Contingencies Act 2004:**
    - Section 26 allows a senior minister to make emergency regulations in the event of an emergency, with a default lapse period of **30 days** unless extended by parliamentary approval. This provision underscores the necessity of regular review and renewal to adapt to ongoing conditions.
- **Digital Markets, Competition, and Consumers Bill:**
    - Requires the CMA to respond within **90 days** to recommendations made by regulators (recommending they exercise a digital markets function), setting out the action they intend to take and including reasoning for its decision.
    - After receiving a report about a merger, the CMA must respond within **5 days** on whether the report is sufficient.
- **Communications Act 2003:**
    - Requires Ofcom to respond within **40 days** of the SoS making a statement on Ofcom's strategic priorities.

These examples illustrate that there is a range for time limits and the diverse contexts in which they are applied. This variability indicates the importance of context in determining appropriate review durations, which we feel is appropriate given the current scope and objectives of the IP(A) Bill.